Chief Executive Officer
REMUNERATION AND RETENTION PRICE
COMPANIES WITH FAMILY-CONTROLLED BOARDS IN HONG KONG
This newspaper examines perhaps the remuneration from the Chief Executive Officer situation in Hk public companies is afflicted with board make up, given the influence of family control on the panels of many Hk companies. It really is hypothesized that I) in family-controlled planks, Chief Executive Officers receiver bigger compensation and II) Chief Executive Officers in family-controlled panels serve as Ceo positions for a longer time. In family-controlled boards, company governance is of very high importance as the independent non-executive directors can exert fewer influence within the board, compared to non-family-controlled boards (" distributed boardsвЂќ).
Keywords: Board formula, Remuneration, Corporate and business Governance.
1 . INTRODUCTION
The monetary turmoil in Asia in 1997 has led to a larger recognition from the importance of company governance. Based on global styles towards larger standards of corporate governance, the duties and liabilities of the company directors of the detailed companies include therefore are more stringent.
It uses that many corporate and business governance components designed to monitor board associates may be ineffectve for family-owned and family-controlled firms. Nevertheless , to attract outside the house investors, family-owned and family-controlled firms often encourage higher independence and monitoring from your board.
For the purposes with the study, family-owned and family-controlled are used interchangeably. The reason is that genuine family possession is difficult to ascertain due to various shareholdings and particular purpose vehicles that are used, and cannot be deduced from twelve-monthly reports.
Thus, through this study all of us classify family-control and family-ownership when the plank is made of most of related family as a " family-controlled boardвЂќ. When it is not, we sort it being a " spread boardвЂќ. Used, there are instances where the family owns almost all a company although comprise of a minority with the board, in fact it is possible that the family is in a position to exert effect via different avenues, however , this examine will not be reviewing such.
Family-owned firms are common throughout Asia. Research shows that, family-owned firms hold more than 20 percent of the collateral of detailed companies in Asia, and even more than 60 percent with the listed firms have links with family-owned groups (Bebchuk & Toast, 2006). Family-owned businesses signify the main form of shown companies in Hong Kong (Standard & Poor's, 2002). This kind of family title structure suggests the strong influence of dominant shareholders and provides limited voice to get minority shareholders. Compared to the Anglo-American environment, exactly where ownership hindrances are less concentrated but institutional investors are usually more prevalent, in Hong Kong, there is certainly less of a culture for non-executive company directors or community shareholder active supporters and workers to problem.
Variations in ownership structure can lead to differences in the size of agency disputes, the tasks of company directors may vary determined by the possession structure. To get family-owned businesses, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the primary agency turmoil is between a family owner and non-family owners. In the meantime, for generally held organizations, Berle and Means (1932), and, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the primary firm conflict can be between management and shareholders. As a consequence, tying remuneration to performance of executives may prove one of the most efficient way to reduce this agency conflict.
To date, a huge of literatures published in recent times show the developing recognition of influences of family-owned companies and business remuneration in corporate governance. Many studies have tended to focus on the use of remuneration contracts to straighten interests of...
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